Sustaining the Nuclear Peace: On the Urgent Need for a New Strategy for Stability
There is no more potentially devastating threat to global peace than nuclear conflict. As President Trump argues, the consequences of a nuclear war would be catastrophic. In the whirl of day-to-day affairs, the prospect of nuclear war can seem remote. But peace among nuclear powers cannot be taken for granted. And today that peace is particularly fragile
Introduction
When we first convened as a study group in late 2023, we set the following objectives: to update our thinking about the state of stability in the strategic military relationship between the United States and Russia, to understand the threats to systemic peace between and among major nuclear powers more generally, to assess the effectiveness of US policy approaches, to characterize the strategic choices facing the United States, and to devise and recommend a new approach that promises greater success in preventing major-power war and preserving systemic peace.
Building on these foundations, we spent a year exploring the concept of strategic stability, the current challenges to strategic stability, and the strengths and weaknesses in a modern context of the legacy US strategy for stability. We then formulated a new approach, which we believe to be well aligned with today’s more challenging security environment and with the interests and capacities of the United States (and also its allies and partners). We recommend its adoption and implementation with urgency. We do so unanimously and without reservation, which inspires our confidence that bipartisanship can carry the day on these high national priorities.
In the course of our work, we were reminded that a great deal of ink has been spilled trying to define strategic stability. For reasons explained in the body of the report, we have developed the following definition: Strategic stability is a condition in which the political relations and military balance between states that pose an existential threat to each other are such that they perceive neither a compelling need nor a viable opportunity to advance their interests at the expense of the vital interests of the other through the use of military force, and especially nuclear weapons.
Our work was informed by the reports of the most recent Strategic Posture Commission and the Commission on the National Defense Strategy.1 Some of the members of our study group were involved in one or the other of these commissions. Their reports, together with this report, paint a compelling picture of a radically changed post-Cold War security environment and of the difficult decisions that US policymakers must make to adapt to it. Those decisions are overdue. But the solutions are within our reach.
This report proceeds as follows. The analytical portion begins with an assessment of the nuclear security environment; in our judgment, stability, deterrence, and security are all eroding—and at an accelerating rate. We then turn to an assessment of US policy. US nuclear policy has many different elements addressing deterrence, assurance, and strategic stability. Our focus is on the strategy for stability, which we see as cross-cutting. In our judgment, the long-standing US approach is not fit for purpose in today’s world; it has failed to deliver and will not deliver the desired results. Something new and substantial is now required of the United States. We then elaborate the key elements and associated concepts for a new strategy for stability. That strategy reprioritizes deterrence, refocuses diplomatic engagement, and bolsters the enablers of success. We close with the argument that the time for wishful thinking is over, and that a new generational effort is required to confront the dangers now arrayed against us as a nation.
We believe that the need for action is urgent. Thus, the report begins with a distillation of findings and recommendations that can be rapidly implemented by the US Government. These items are highlighted at the front of the report to focus political attention on the near-term steps needed to address critical imbalances and to signal a change of course to US adversaries and allies and partners. Such signals can be expected to have a positive impact on deterrence, assurance, and strategic stability. We also make recommendations for ongoing and enduring initiatives.
This report enjoys the unanimous support of the study group’s members and appears without caveats or other dissents.